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This paper investigates the macroeconomic importance of credit rationing and whether banks 
use characteristics such as ownership structure and institutional type of borrowers in order to 
regulate the risk of loaned funds. To test this, monthly data for 2000–2002, extracted from the 
National Bank of Slovakia monetary review, were used. The paper finds that credit rationing 
was not present during the period analysed, implying that the credit market can be 
approximated with a typical supply and demand relationship. The second finding of the paper 
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Access to credit is an important factor that determines the investment behaviour of firms and 
thus the performance of the real economy. This is even more pronounced in transition 
countries, given the fact that their economies need to be restructured and modernised. Some 
firms, or borrowers, may be rationed and not get full access to credit, even though they may 
be willing to pay a higher interest rate than the one charged by intermediaries. Thus the 
typical law of supply and demand may not hold, meaning that the credit market does not clear 
at the rate where demand equals supply. Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) have shown that, owing to 
asymmetric information, banks may not be willing to offer a loan to all applicants. Some of 
the applicants may be rationed because of adverse selection. With an increase in the loan rate, 
banks’ profits may decline because the pool of applicants that apply for loans worsens. In this 
situation only riskier applicants are able to obtain positive expected profits, thus only they 
apply for loans. By charging a lower loan rate, a bank’s profits may increase because it 
attracts less risky borrowers. An equilibrium situation may therefore arise where the 
intermediaries charge a lower loan rate than the market clearing rate. 
An important assumption behind this result is that intermediaries cannot distinguish 
between different types of borrowers. In reality this may not always be the case. For instance, 
characteristics of a loan applicant that are almost costlessly observed are ownership (state 
versus private) and institutional form (profit versus non-profit). Different groups of borrowers 
might be associated with different levels of risk, with different levels of average profits, and   4
thus can be offered different contracts. This means that the loan rate charged by 
intermediaries will differ among the distinguishable groups. The most profitable groups, from 
the bank’s perspective, will be offered a loan first, and rationed credit might ultimately be 
offered to one group only, the least profitable one. Riley (1987) has shown that when there is 
a large number of borrowers’ groups, the macroeconomic importance of credit rationing 
declines and might be unimportant empirically. Rather the typical supply and demand 
relationship should hold. 
In this paper data from the National Bank of Slovakia (NBS) are used first to test the 
macroeconomic importance of the Stiglitz & Weiss (1981) credit rationing versus Riley’s 
(1987) no credit rationing, and second to test whether characteristics such as ownership 
structure and institutional type of borrowers are used by intermediaries to regulate risk. 
The paper is organised as follows. The next two sections discuss how risk is related to 
ownership and institutional type of borrowers respectively. We then describe the data used 
and discuss the estimating framework and the results. The final section concludes. 
 
Risk and Ownership 
Ownership type alters incentives within a firm and thus it affects the firm's overall 
performance. Private owned firms unlike state owned ones, are expected to perform activities 
more efficient since the owners are residual claimants and therefore they have incentive to 
obtain maximum revenues with minimum costs. Consequently it is expected that activities 
undertaken by private firm are expected to yield a larger expected return as compared to 
returns earned from the same activities if undertaken by state firms.  
When borrowing, private firms put at stake their assets either as collateral or in the 
case that they default, the lender seizes their assets. By contrast, state firms use state assets   5
and there is not a direct individual that would bear the losses of potential default. The effect of 
this is that state firms might be involved in riskier activities as compared to private ones.  
Private firms, being more profitable and being involved in less riskier activities, are 
therefore expected to be categorised by intermediaries as a group of borrowers with better 
credit worthiness. However, state always can intervene to support its firms when they have 
financial difficulties and thus this may offset the disadvantage that state firms have toward 
banks due to being less efficient and riskier. This practice was widely spread in former 
communist countries. Public or state firms used to operate under soft budget constraint during 
the Communism (Kornai, 1980). Politically, default was not acceptable and it was usually 
avoided thorough wide range of financial aid provided by the state. This aid was usually in the 
from of loan guarantees, subsidies and price support. To a large extent, the state continued 
with this practice after the fall of Communism (Tajnikar, 2001; Lizal & Svejnar, 2002; 
Konings et al. 2003). Loan guaranties and subsidies granted to the state sector were relatively 
common in the new economic and political environment introduced at the beginning of the 
90s.   
In summary, there are two opposite factors that affect credit worthiness of private 
versus state owned borrowers. Firstly, because of enhanced incentives and involvement in less 
riskier activities, private borrowers are expected to be preferred by intermediaries and offered 
a lower loan rate in order to avoid adverse selection. State firms being riskier are offered a 
higher loan rate because the bank's maximum profit reaches the peak at a higher rate. 
Secondly, this disadvantage of state firms may be offset by state interventions. If the 
government is active in supporting state firms, lending to them becomes less risky and thus it 
might be observed that intermediaries offer them a lower loan rate. 
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Risk and Institutional Type of Borrowers 
Organisations that apply for a loan can be of different institutional type. Two important 
categories are of a particular importance: profit driven and non-profit driven organisations. 
The motives of running a profit organisation are usually to make profits and distribute it to its 
owners. On the other hand, non-profit organisations perform activities in order to fulfil other 
then financial needs to its founders. This differences in motives between the two institutional 
types affects incentives within them in disfavour of non-profit organisations. Moreover, non-
profit companies are usually involved in activities that are commercially less profitable, with 
low returns and therefore more risky. As a result, intermediaries are expected to provide a 
better contract to profit organisation as compared to non-profit.  
 
Data 
Monthly data for period 2000 - 2002, extracted from the National Bank of Slovakia monetary 
review, were used. Among others, the data include macroeconomic indicators and loan rates 
charged by intermediaries for borrowers categorised by ownership and institutional type. 
Summary statistics are shown in tables 1 and 2. Table 1 gives selected macroeconomic 
variables. Table 2 provides average yearly loan rates categorised by borrower type.  
GDP growth, inflation and foreign reserves show an improvement while trade balance, 
foreign debts and budget deficit have worsened over the period 2000-2001. Concerning 
unemployment, it remained relatively unchanged over this period. From Table 2 it can be 
noted that foreign private firms and households obtained credits with the lowest loan rate. 
They were followed by state firms, domestic private firms and public administration. The last 
in this ranking are non-profit organisations. They were charged the highest loan rate. 
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The Estimating Framework  
In order to test macroeconomic importance of credit rationing and whether the characteristics 
such as ownership structure and institutional type of borrowers are used by the intermediaries 
to regulate risk, the following model is estimated: 
 
LOANRit = C + α*DEPOSITRt-1 + β*DEPOSITt-3 + δ*M(2)t +ε*INFt-1 + φ*NETDEBTt-2 +  
γ*TRADEt + ϕ*Gt + κ*TREND + η1*DOM_PR_Fit + η2*FOR_PR_Fit + η3*PUBLICADit + 
η4*HOUSHit + η5*NOPR_Oit + η6*OTHERit +μ*LOANRit-1 + wit 
 
where C is a constant, LOANRit is average monthly loan rate that intermediaries charge 
borrower type i
1 at period t, DEPOSITR is average monthly deposit rate earned by deposit 
holders, DEPOSIT are total deposits and proxies for the supply of money that intermediaries 
can use as loanable funds, M(2) is M(2) money and it reflects the stance of the monetary 
policy of the Central Bank, NETDEBT are Slovak foreign debts minus foreign currency 
reserves, TRADE is trade balance, G is budget deficit, TREND is time variable and wit is 
error term assumed to be independent with normal distribution and with mean zero. Seven 
type of borrowers are distinguished: state firms, domestic private firms (DOM_PR_F), 
foreign private firms (FOR_PR_F), public administration (PUBLICAD), households 
(HOUSH), non-profit organisations (NOPR_O ) and other borrowers (OTHER). For all of 
them a dummy variable was introduced. The dummy variable takes value 1 if the observation 
is for type i otherwise it takes value 0. To avoid perfect multicollinearity the dummy variable 
for state firms was excluded from the model. As a result, all the estimated coefficients η1 … η6  
will represent the relative difference in the loan rate between what state farms and a respective 
type of borrower are charged by intermediaries.    8
Following Riley's (1987) suggestion, coefficients β, which stands for the total deposits 
supplied to the bank sector, will be used to test for the presence of credit rationing. If the 
coefficient is statistically not significant, then credit rationing is present. An insignificant 
coefficient implies that the loan rate charged by intermediaries is not affected by the change in 
the total supply of loanable funds. Thus there must be a significant amount of rationed 
borrowers who are willing to pay a higher loan rate than the one charged by intermediaries. If 
the coefficient is negative and significant then credit rationing is unimportant at 
macroeconomic level, rather a typical supply-demand relationship holds. The more loanable 
funds are available the lower the loan rate is.  
The coefficients corresponding to borrower type η1 … η6 will be used to test whether 
intermediaries are using borrowers' characteristics (ownership and institutional type) to 
regulate risk of the loaned funds. If the coefficients are statistically significant then 
intermediaries are indeed using borrowers' characteristics to regulate risk. In this case each 
type of borrower will be offered a different loan rate. This is because, as explained above, the 
types differ in their riskyness and in the expected return that they earn from the performed 
activities. When a bank increases the loan rate for type i then there are two opposing effects 
which affect the bank's return earned from borrowers of type i. The first is a direct effect 
which is transmitted through the change of the bank's return per each Slovak crown loaned. 
When the bank increases the loan rate, the return per each crown loaned increases 
proportionally with the change in loan rate. The second effect is indirect, via worsening the 
pool of borrowers that apply for loans. Only more risky borrowers apply for a loan when the 
bank increases the loan rate, and consequently as more of them default the bank's return 
declines. Therefore, there must be an optimal loan rate, for each type different, at which the 
bank's returns reach maximum per each crown invested. If the loan rate charged is below this 
optimal rate, then the first effect dominates the second, while at a rate above the optimal loan   9
rate, the second effect dominates the first. Assuming perfect competition in the banking 
sector, the equilibrium arises where for each group of borrowers, banks earn the same return 
per crown invested and also banks earn zero profit (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). From this 
immediately follows, that in order the bank to earn from each group the same return per 
crown loaned, it must charge each group a different loan rate. When assuming that all the 
categories of borrowers earn the same expected return for a given activity, a higher loan rate 
will be associated with more riskier borrowers. However if the coefficients η1 … η6  are 
statistically not significant then banks are not using ownership and institutional characteristics 
of borrowers to regulate risk and they charge the same rate each type.  
 
Empirical Estimates 
The regression results are reported in Table 3. In the first column estimated results using 
simple OLS are shown. The White heteroskedasticity test, shown at the bottom of the table 3, 
indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity, meaning that the variance of the error term varies 
over the observations. One would expect that the variance for the high-loan rate borrowers is 
higher than the variance for the low-loan rate borrowers. As a result, White standard errors are 
used instead of the standard OLS errors.  
To account for the presence of heteroskedasticity, weighted OLS is also estimated. 
The results are reported in the second column of table 3. The White test indicates that the 
heteroskedasticity was removed. 
The estimated β coefficients, corresponding to the variable total deposits supplied to 
intermediaries (DEPOSIT), are negative and significant for the weighted OLS. This result 
implies that credit rationing was not present in Slovakia during the analysed period 2000-
2002. Rather, the credit market operated through classical Walrasian mechanism, where 
market clears at the rate where supply equals demand. This finding has an important   10
implication for monetary policy. Namely that the monetary policy is transmitted to real 
economy through interest rate channel rather than through credit rationing channel as 
suggested by Blinder & Stiglitz (1983) and Blinder (1987).  
The coefficients η1 … η6  standing for borrower type, DOM_PR_F, FOR_PR_F, 
PUBLICAD, HOUSH, NOPR_O, OTHER, are highly significant for all two models. The only 
exemption is the coefficient corresponding to the other borrowers group. This implies that 
intermediaries are using borrowers' characteristics (ownership and institutional type) to 
regulate the risk of the loaned funds. Each category of borrower is offered a different loan 
rate. The values of the coefficients represent the relative difference in the loan rate with 
respect to state firms. A negative value of the coefficient for a respective group implies that 
the group was charged a lower loan rate than the state firms, while a positive value implies the 
opposite.  
According to the expectation, intermediaries charged domestic private firms 
(DOM_PR_F) a higher loan rate than the state firms. Thus the state firms disadvantage of 
being less efficient and involved in riskier activities is offset by the government's provision of 
aid in times of financial distress. On the other hand, this does not hold if compared with 
foreign private firms (FOR_PR_F). They received loans with a lower rate than the state firms. 
Foreign owned firms might be associated with better entrepreneurial capabilities and most 
importantly they might be financially backed by their parent company. Thus this enhances 
their credit worthiness as compared to state firms and domestic private firms. Regarding non-
profit organisations (NOPR_O), as expected, they were charged the highest loan rate, 
reflecting their low efficiency and high level of risk when lending to them.  
The signs of the coefficients for the variables public administration (PUBLICAD) and 
households (HOUSH) are rather unexpected. Public administration obtained more expensive 
loans while household obtained cheaper loans then the state firms. Public administration   11
includes mostly local governments and households include private individuals. One would 
expect that borrowing to the public sector is associated with low risk and therefore it would be 
offered a lower rate than the state firms, while the opposite is valid for households. An 
explanation is that government provides subsidies for mortgage loans acquired by households, 
which significantly decreases the rate that they have to pay.  
The majority of the coefficients for the remaining variables are statistically significant 
for the weighted OLS. The variable G, standing for the state budget deficit, and variable 
TRADE, standing for trade balance are the only two that are significant for both models. The 
sign for G is negative according to the expectation, implying that when government 
borrowing increases (when the budget deficit is larger), the loan rates charged by 
intermediaries increase for all categories of borrowers. What concerns the coefficient of 
TRADE variable, its sign is positive. A lower trade deficit might be as a result of an increase 
of domestic or foreign demand for domestic goods, which has a positive effect on economic 
activity. This in return increases the financial needs of the companies and therefore it has an 
upward pressure on interest rate. Regarding the coefficient corresponding to deposit rate, it is 
significant (DEPOSITR) for the weighted OLS model. This is expected result, confirming 
Riley's (1987) finding that the loan rate for each category increases with the equilibrium cost 
of loanable funds. The sign of the coefficient standing for the variable inflation (INF) is also 
in accordance with expectation, positive, but again significant only when estimated by the 
weighted OLS. Finally, the variable reflecting the stance of the monetary policy of the Central 
Bank, M(2), is significant at 10% for weighted OLS model and has expected sign. This result 
shows that a decline in stock of money (restrictive monetary policy) leads to an increase of 
the interest rate charged by intermediaries.  
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Conclusions 
This paper has used monthly data extracted from the National Bank of Slovakia monetary 
review to test for macroeconomic importance of credit rationing and to test whether the 
characteristics such as ownership structure and institutional type of borrowers are used by the 
intermediaries to regulate risk. 
The paper find that credit rationing was not present in Slovakia during the analysed 
period, implying that Slovak credit market can be approximated with typical supply and 
demand relationship where market clears at the rate where supply equals demand. This 
however has an important implication for monetary policy. Namely that the monetary policy 
is transmitted to real economy through interest rate channel rather than through credit 
rationing channel as suggested by Blinder & Stiglitz (1983) and Blinder (1987).  
Other important finding of the paper is that intermediaries are using borrowers' 
characteristics, such as their ownership structure and institutional form, to regulate for the 
risk. Different categories are offered a different loan rate. Non-profit organisations obtain the 
most expensive loans while foreign private firms and households obtain the cheapest loans. 
The results also imply that the government still provides a significant amount of financial aid 
to state firms so that lending to them is less risky as compared to lending to domestic private 
firms even though they are more efficient.  
 
Notes 
1. For i = state firms, domestic private firms, foreign private firms, public administration, 
households, non-profit organisations and other borrowers. 
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Table 1. Main macroeconomic indicators 
   2000  2001  2002 
GDP growth (%)  1.7  3.1  4.1 
Unemployment (%)  16.7  18.3  17.8 
Inflation (%)  12.2  7.3  3.4 
Trade balance (% of GDP)  -4.7  -10.4   
Budget deficit (% of GDP)   -3.1  -4.5   
Foreign reserves  (bn. USD)  5.1  5.3  8.1 
Foreign debts (bn. USD)  10.7  10.9  11.9 









Table 2. Average yearly loan rates by borrower type (%) 
   2000  2001  2002 
State firms  11.8  9.6  9.8 
Domestic private firms   14.7  11.2  10.2 
Foreign private firms  10.0  8.4  8.1 
Public administration  16.0  11.4  10.0 
Households  8.5  8.8  10.1 
Non-profit organisations  20.2  16.8  13.6 
Other   11.4  9.2  10.9 
Source: National Bank of Slovakia   15
Table 3. Dependent Variable: log(LOANRit) 
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Adjusted R-squared  0.677  0.997 
RESET test (p-values) 
   FITTED^2 







    
White Heterosked. test (p-values) 
   - No cross terms 






Standard errors in parenthesis. 
*** = significant at 1% level 
** = significant at 5% level 
* = significant at 10% level 
In the last four rows p-values for RESET tests and White Heteroskedasticity test are provided. A value lower than 0.05 for 
RESET test would suggest that the model is misspecified at 5% significance level.  A value lower than 0.05 for White 
Heteroskedasticity test would suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity at 5% significance level. 